The technological specialization of Europe in the 1990s by Foders, Federico
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Foders, Federico
Working Paper
The technological specialization of
Europe in the 1990s
Kiel Working Papers, No. 675
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Foders, Federico (1995) : The technological specialization of Europe in the
1990s, Kiel Working Papers, No. 675, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/681Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 675
The Technological Specialization
of Europe in the 1990s*
by
Federico Foders
February 1995
Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342 - 0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Dusternbrooker Weg 120
24105 Kiel
Federal Republic of Germany
Kiel Working Paper No. 675
The Technological Specialization
of Europe in the 1990s*
by
Federico Foders rC\^ J\A
February 1995 D ->
 J ^
 N
This paper is part of a multi-year research project on "Transfer of Energy
Technologies to Eastern Europe: An Economic Analysis of the Bulgarian,
Czech and Slovak Cases"; financial support has been provided by the
European Commission in the framework of the Copernicus Programme. I am
indebted to Kai Carstensen for research assistance, to Christel Hartz and
Evelyn Jann for computational assistance, and to Irene Baur for mastering the
paper's word-processing requirements.
The author himself, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, is solely
responsible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers
are requested to direct criticisms and suggestions directly to the author and to
clear any quotations with him.TSE.DOC . (16.03.95
Abstract
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the international position of
Europe by (i) presenting new evidence on technological specialization and
competitiveness and (ii) exploring methodological issues underlying the
empirical analysis. The results show that the technological profile of the member
countries of the European Union offers a wide scope for technology transfer and
inter-industry trade both within the European Union and between the member
countries of the European Union on the one hand and Japan, the United States
and Eastern Europe on the other. However, risks loom large in the possible
eastward enlargement of the European Union and in the formation of a monetary
union, because of the former's and the latter's potential impact on the European
Union's technological profile and the international competitiveness of European
firms.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95
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I. Introduction
In its White Book on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment" the European
Commission spotted deficits in three key areas of economic policy. In particular,
European unemployment is attributed in part to changes in the relative position of
the member countries of the European Union (EU) vis-a-vis the United States and
Japan with respect to world market shares, R&D, innovation, and the ability to
commercially exploit new products (European Commission 1993, p. 10). This
rather pessimistic diagnosis concerning the health status of European economies
and firms has been vigorously challenged in a survey on "The European Union"
recently published by The Economist: "For all the liabilities of its social costs and
lack of entrepreneurs, the EU has plenty of assets: for example, a well-educated
workforce ..., good engineering skills, and a tradition of expertise in advanced
technologies" (Vol. 333, No. 7886,22 October 1994, p. 18). It is not the first time
that the issue of European technological (incompetence or lack of international
competitiveness in high-technology products is raised. What makes the current
discussion in Europe different is that the marked diversity of opinion found at the
policy level is now not only matched by a renaissance of the academic debate on
competitiveness but also by similar developments in the United States (Nelson,
Wright 1992). Michael Porter (1990) and Paul Krugman (1994) have refuelled the
academic debate in the United States, to a certain extent as a reaction to a public
discussion largely influenced by Lester Thurow (1992) and Laura d' Andrea Tyson
(1992), who borrowed from Jean-Jaques Servan-Schreiber's (1967) spirit as
reflected in his book "Le defi americain" to detect something like "Le defi europeen
etjaponais".
It is the main purpose of this paper to contribute to the current discussion on the
international position of Europe by presenting empirical evidence on the actual
technological specialization of EU member countries and confronting it with the
pessimistic and the optimistic hypotheses sketched above. Empirical studies of the
international technological position of countries may also find some justification in
recent developments in economic theory, especially in the field of economic
growth. In the new theory of economic growth technology occupies centre stage.
Taking an international perspective, the theory attributes growth to (endogenous)
technical progress and its diffusion, and predicts the emergence of two groups of
countries in the international division of labour: technological leaders (innovators
and exporters of technology) and technological followers (imitators and importers
of technology) (Grossman, Helpman 1994, p. 41). Finally, research on the currentTSE.DOC . 06.03.95
role of EU member countries in the world economy could help to anticipate the
potential impact of the recent northward enlargement of the Union to include
Austria, Finland, and Sweden - for the time being, Norway remains a permanent
candidate -, and of the eastward enlargement projected for the early years of the
21st Century. Official plans foresee the membership of only a few Central and
Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic). But in view of the fact that the list of potential candidates for
membership is extended almost daily in public announcements (to include Bulgaria,
Romania, the Baltic States, etc.), eastward enlargement is very likely to remain high
on the agenda of European integration in the next decades.
1 In accepting an
increasing number of largely heterogeneous countries as full members, the
international position of the old EU members is likely to be affected as it also might
be in the wake of the further deepening of the EU along the lines of the Maastricht
treaty, for example, by forming a monetary union. Any enlargement- or
Maastricht-induced changes in the international position of Europe - be they
avoidable or inevitable - would be much easier to handle at the policy level if the
point of departure were better known. The next section deals with methodological
problems related to the empirical estimation of the technology content of trade. In
Section HI the empirical evidence on technological specialization is presented and
discussed. Section IV addresses the relationship between technological
specialization and competitiveness, and presents evidence on the latter. The last
section comprises a summary of the main results and some policy conclusions.
II. Technology Content of Tradables: Methodological Aspects
1. Identifying High-Technology Products
The first step in the estimation of the technological sophistication of traded goods is
to classify the traded goods into different groups according to their technology
content. This is generally done in the literature by hypothesizing that a product's
"technology content" is positively correlated with the level of the ratio of R&D
expenditures to sales or value of output of the same product. If one were to accept
The European Commission signed so-called "Europe Agreements" with Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic. Hungary and Poland have
already formally applied for membership in 1994, the Slovak and the Czech Republics could
follow in 1995 and 1996, respectively. A Free Trade Agreement has been signed with the Baltic
States.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95
this hypothesis as leading to a useful proxy, the immediate problem to be solved
relates to the fact that statistics on R&D expenditures are usually available only at
the firm level and sometimes at the plant level, but almost never at the product
level. A formula has to be found to convert firm or plant data to product data. In
case one succeeds, the next task is to divide the goods into the different categories
needed for the subsequent analyses employing appropriate criteria. A glance at the
empirical literature reveals that economists tend to vary greatly in their choice of
the product composition of the high-technology category of goods. Without
pretending to be exhaustive, Table 1 presents a selection of the most widely used
definitions.
2 Balassa and Noland (1988), for example, define high-technology
products as "products where the ratio of research and development expenditures to
the value of output exceeded 3.5 percent in the mid-1970s in the United States"
(Balassa, Noland 1988, p. 209). These authors are able to identify a total number of
19 US SIC categories using R&D data collected by the US Federal Trade
Commission at the four-digit SIC plant level. Kravis and Lipsey (1992) draw
heavily on a study on the behaviour of US multinationals in 1982 carried out by the
US Department of Commerce and published in 1985, which also applies a
R&D/sales ratio to determine the technological sophistication of goods, but for
other reference years than Balassa and Noland.
A somewhat different approach has been proposed by Scherer and Huh (1992) who
define high-technology goods as US SIC sectors "in which product and/or process
innovation has been prominent" (Scherer, Huh 1992, p. 203). In doing so, Scherer
and Huh seem to suggest that it might be helpful to improve our knowledge about
the innovative industries, which is tantamount to say that expert opinion matters,
possibly more than the R&D/sales ratio. Furthermore, to take recourse to expert
opinion does not imply that thousands of interviews will have to be carried out and
that it is necessary to know in detail which firm has recently invested in which kind
of new machinery or new products. As far as process innovations are concerned, it
is sufficient to consult expert opinion on organizational innovations, which are
hypothesized by some authors (Porter 1990; Milgrom, Roberts 1992) to constitute
the leading component of process innovations in the 1990s, following the example
of the automobile industry (Womack, Jones, Roos 1990). The most important recent
organizational innovation with an impact on manufacturing is computer-integrated
manufacturing (CIM). Put in simple terms, CIM denotes the intensive use of
computers to link key technical with key management functions within the
Alternative definitions have been proposed, among others, by Klodt, Stehn et al. (1994, p. 38).TSE.DQC . O6.(R9S
Table 1. Alternative Definitions of High-Technology Products by SITC
(Rev. 3) Code Numbers
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the Appendix.
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3) code numbers
Scherer/Huh
54
72
74
75
764
772
774
776
778
792
793
87
88
56
583
6514 to 8
71
8121
786
64
5 (less 54,583)
62
66
67
68
69
71
73
77 (less 772,774,776,
778)
78
79 (less 792,793)
89
are presented in Table Al in
Source: Own compilation and conversion from US SIC to UN SITC (Rev. 3);
Foders, Wolfrum et al. (1993); Balassa, Noland (1988); Kravis,
Lipsey (1992), Scherer, Huh (1992).TSE.DOC . 06.03.95
manufacturing firm, thereby integrating such divisional units as design and
engineering with manufacturing, quality control and marketing; CIM also allows for
an incorporation of other firms (suppliers and/or customers) into the computer
network. The main physical precondition for CIM (in addition to specific hardware
and software) is the substitution of traditional capital goods for computerized and
networked capital goods with a high degree of automation and flexibility. For
example, in those industries in which machine tools are employed, the introduction
of CIM calls for computerized numerical control (CNC) machine tools instead of
mechanical machines. It suffices then to find out which industries have switched to
CIM and reorganized to fully integrate state-of-the-art information technologies into
the firm, a kind of data easily found in the business press and other related media
where process and product innovations are usually made public.
In their study, Scherer and Huh also carefully scrutinize the changes over time of
the R&D/sales ratios for a 17-year panel covering 308 US manufacturing firms and
conclude that the ratios are subject to frequent and, more importantly, unsystematic
changes, "related neither to import competition changes nor to other plausible
explanatory variables" (Scherer, Huh 1992, p. 212). This finding seems to rather
disqualify the R&D/sales ratio as an authoritative criterion to divide high- from
low-technology goods. This explains why two independent researchers employing
the same criterion, namely the R&D/sales ratio, but for different years or levels of
aggregation, necessarily arrive at diverging sets of high-technology products for the
same country. Moreover, in defining the group of high-technology goods, Scherer
and Huh differ from other authors in that they emphasize the role of process
innovations on the ground that competitive imports originating in Japan might have
benefited from them, taking into account that "Japanese firms spend a higher
fraction of their R&D budgets than American industry" on process innovations
(Scherer, Huh 1992, p. 211). This procedure points at the risk of overlooking parts
of the game by focusing only on product innovations in studies of international
specialization, even if the latter were to constitute the distinct characteristic of
domestic technical progress.
Finally, in searching for an optimal definition of different categories of technology-
embodying goods a statistical issue has to be addressed. To statistically identify,
say, high-technology goods at the lowest level of aggregation possible might be a
very accurate way of discriminating between goods according to their technology
content. However, since every classification is necessarily subject to the point in
time at which it is made, extreme disaggregation will tend to make such aTSE.DOC . 06.03.95
classification very sensitive to changes over time in the distribution of inventive
activity over industries, processes, and products. In an era of ever shorter product
(and process) life cycles, a higher level of aggregation would be the obvious
recommendation. On the other hand, higher levels of aggregation suffer from being
less accurate than lower ones due to the inclusion of goods that have not been
affected at all by innovation. Higher levels of aggregation are bound to increase the
risk of turning a fact into an artifact. Thus, the optimal level of aggregation should
be preferably tailored to the purpose and time horizon of each study.
In this study a division of traded goods according to their technology content is used
which has been derived in a two-step procedure. Following the approach suggested
by Scherer and Huh and drawing on expert information about product and process
innovations gathered in 1992/93, a first breakdown at the three-digit level of SITC
(Rev. 3) was obtained. This classification was then complemented by the one used
by Balassa and Noland (1988) in those cases in which expert opinion was
ambiguous or not available. The final definitions were classified at a mixed level of
aggregation, including one-, two- and three-digit SITC product groups. The
definitions used in this paper (Table 1 and Table Al in the Appendix) were
originally applied in a multi-year study on entry barriers in North America faced by
European firms carried out by Foders, Wolfrum et al. (1993).
2. Measuring a Country's Technological Specialization
The index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) is one of the most popular
indicators found in the vast empirical literature on the patterns of inter-industry
trade. Although the pure theory of international trade offers explanations for
patterns of inter-industry trade based on pre-trade considerations, empirical tests
have to operate with post-trade data. In this spirit, actual trade data is often taken to
directly reflect a country's comparative advantage in terms of, say, relative factor
proportions, the role of the RCA index in tests of trade theory being to present
actual trade data in such a way that the relative position of a country vis-a-vis
selected countries or the rest of the world can be inferred. The extent to which the
different versions of the RCA index found in the literature (export in dex, net-export
index, etc.) are correlated with proxies reflecting country characteristics (for
example, factor inputs) has been the subject of a large number of econometric
studies which yielded mixed results and led to a lively debate of the kind "my RCA
index is better than yours" (Vollrath 1991; Memedovic 1994). One of the most
relevant results of this still ongoing debate is that each version of the index mayTSE.DOC . 06.03.95
show a different trade pattern for the same country and point in time, and that the
indices cannot be expected to be highly correlated with each other (Ballance,
Forstner, Murray 1987, p. 159; UNIDO 1983, p. 337). The lesson from this is that
the choice of the index matters.
This study differs from those mentioned above in that it focuses on trade
specialization per se and not on the measurement of comparative advantage. This
notwithstanding, it faces the same problem of index choice as the studies dealing
with other aspects of international trade. With no generally accepted criterion
around to identify the first- or second-best RCA index, in this study use is made of
an index capable of showing a country's net-export position in a certain good (=
specialization), weighted by its trade balance, which has been applied in empirical
analysis by Wolter (1977), among others. The goods are classified according to
their technology content as shown in Table Al in the Appendix, enabling the index
to reveal a country's specialization in certain categories of technology-embodying
goods. The index, which for the purpose of this study shall be called the index of
technological specialization (TS), in order to avoid a semantical confusion with
"comparative advantage", is defined as:
X
i
n
2'
i
U
xij
U
= In | -^- I - In
where: XJJ = nominal value of country j's exports of good i to the OECD
countries,
my = nominal value of country j's imports of good i from the OECD
countries,
X.*,-, = total nominal value of country j's exports to the OECD
i
countries,
ij = total nominal value of country j's imports from the OECD
countries.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95
Due to the natural logarithm, TS is normalized at zero. For deviations from zero the
values of TS are subject to an elasticity of TS with respect to changes in xjj/mjj that
decreases as | xy - my | increases. Moreover, taking limits TS is unbounded in both
directions: if xy/my tends to infinity, then TS also tends to infinity; if xy/my tends
to zero, then TS tends to minus infinity, with xy = 0 and my = 0 generally
undefined. As has been shown by Yeats (1985, p. 71), RCA indices neither fulfil
the properties of ordinal nor those of cardinal measures, a fact that restricts the use
of such indices to indicating, as in the case of TS, either specialization (TS > 0) or
the absence of specialization (TS < 0) in a particular good or group of goods. A
shortcoming of this dichotomous measure is that values in the neighbourhood of
zero, for example, 0.001 and minus 0.001, are both equally valid, albeit difficult to
interpret. Similarly, TS = 0 detects the absence of specialization in the sense of
inter-industry trade yet could also be taken to reflect a different kind of
specialization, namely in the sense of intra-industry trade. In this study, however,
we subscribe to the inter-industry interpretation of specialization.
Furthermore, in (1), the ratio xy/my is weighted by the ratio of total imports to total
exports which is tantamount to say that the trade balance has a role in making TS
positive or negative. In other words, a country's specialization in a certain good
changes over time (i. e. might turn negative) as shifts in the trade balance occur,
even if xy and my were to remain constant. For example, for xy/my = 2 and £*y /
y
Xm,7 = 1, TS is equal to 0.69. A trade surplus leading to the second term in (1)
y
becoming equal to 2.5 while the first term remains constant, results in TS = -0.23.
Thus the weighting system tends to correct the ratio xy / my for fluctuations in the
exchange rate and/or protection measures affecting exports (subsidies) and/or
imports (tariffs and non-tariff barriers) with an impact on a country's overall trade
balance and technological profile.
3
It should be noted that the inclusion of the trade balance in TS does not contribute to highlight
the "importance" of a particular good in a country's foreign trade. A simple example explains
the issue: let total exports and total imports be constant and each equal to 100, and let a
particular good's exports and imports fall from 80 to only 8 and from 10 to only 1, respectively.
In the first case, TS = 2.08, and in the second case, TS = 2.08, i. e. TS is unchanged, in spite of
the fact that the "importance" of this good (exports or imports as a share of total exports or
imports) was drastically reduced. As was mentioned in the text, only the ratio between exports
and imports really matters.TSE.DOC . 06.03.9S
III. International Specialization of Europe
1. Overall Specialization
A glance at Table 2 reveals the international technological specialization of the
twelve "old" member countries of the EU, the four countries which either joined the
EU on 1 January 1995 or are expected to do so later (Norway), and five countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, some of which could be eligible as candidates for the
first eastward enlargement of the EU in the early years of the next century. Taking
the year 1992 as a benchmark (the latest year for which trade data were available),
three clubs of European countries can be identified according to their revealed
specialization in standard-, intermediate- and high-technology products. The group
of technological leaders specialized either only in high-technology goods or in both
intermediate- and high-technology goods includes Germany, France, the United
Kingdom and Sweden (Club 1), as well as third countries like Japan and the United
States. Of the Club 1 members only France is not specialized in intermediate
technology goods, a pattern that can also be observed in 1989. A second club is
composed of countries focusing mainly on intermediate-technology products (with
some scope for high and standard technology), the members of which are Ireland,
Italy, Belgium/Luxembourg, Spain, Finland and Norway. The third club extends to
countries exclusively specialized in standard-technology goods, comprising
Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland and Romania,
A proposition of the new theory of economic growth maintains that technology and
growth (and thus the level of income) are related, the only possible and transitory
exception being the growth pattern of natural resource-rich countries (Grossman,
Helpman 1994). It should be of interest to find out whether the clubs formed by
grouping countries with a similar pattern of technological specialization also reflect
similarities in the level of per capita income. Table 3 shows that at least on average
a relationship between specialization and income exists, in spite of the fact that the
deviation of the individual member's income from the simple club average is
inversely associated with the degree of sophistication of its international
technological specialization. Thus while Club 1 is quite homogeneous, Club 3 is
characterized by members with rather diverging per capita incomes. These
divergences seem to indicate that per capita income might not always be a reliable
proxy for the technological specialization of countries.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 JLQ
Table 2. Europe: International Technological Specialization
8,1989 and 1992
Country
EU Member Countries
Belgium/Luxembourg
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
New or Potential EU
Member Countries
Austria
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Potential Future EU
Member Countries
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
0
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Third Countries
Japan
United States
a As measured by the TS
Technology Content of Traded Goods
Standard
1989
0.02
0.26
0.04
-0.42
0.63
0.24
0.13
0.07
0.61
0.07
-0.20
0.10
0.05
-0.20
-0.09
0.58
0.69
0.75
0.40
0.05
-1.19
0.05
ndex;
1992
0.01
0.30
-0.0004
-0.37
0.76
0.19
0.21
0.08
0.57
0.15
-0.23
0.07
-0.12
-0.51
-0.23
0.75
0.77
0.58
0.54
0.47
-1.18
-0.10
Intermediate
1989
0.04
-0.64
-0.09
0.22
-0.95
-0.61
-0.37
-0.01
-0.64
-0.28
-0.01
-0.04
0.07
0.91
0.08
-0.03
0.03
-0.37
0,05
0.05
0.23
-0.39
b OECD trade statistics for 1989 and 1992 are not yet
Czech and the Slovak Republics.
1992
0.06
-0.45
-0.05
0.14
-1.13
-0.40
-0.45
-0.05
-0.58
0.02
0.09
-0.03
0.20
0.85
0.14
-0.78
-0.12
-0.32
-0.20
-0.41
0.16
0.02
available
High
1989
-0.21
0.08
0.06
0.28
-2.11
0.13
0.25
-0.11
-0.85
-0.77
0.26
-0.13
-0.19
-1.21
0.01
-1.40
-1.77
-1.37
-1.57
-1.09
1.20
0.40
1992
-0.19
-0.08
0.08
0.28
-1.87
0.04
0.19
-0.09
-0.84
-0.33
0.18
-0.07
-0.19
-0.83
0.09
-1.55
-1.45
-0.94
-1.51
-1.82
1.06
0.07
separately for the
Source: Own calculations with OECD trade data.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95
Table 3. Europe: Technology and Income, 1992
Country/Club
Club l
c
France
Germany
Sweden
United Kingdom
Club 2C
Belgium/Luxembourg
Finland
Ireland
Italy
Norway
Spain
Club 3C
Austria
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Greece
Hungary
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Third Countries
0
Japan
United States
a World Bank estimates based on purchasing
terms of gross national product (GNP);
b own estimates;
c simple group average.
Index of GNP per capita
(US = 100)
a
80.2
83.0
89.1
76.2
72.4
68.8
78.5
b
69.1
52.2
76.7
78.0
57.0
42.3
79.4
22.2
28.0
b
80.7
34.6
24.8
76.0
21.1
43.8
11.9
93.6
87.2
100.0
power parities and expressed in
Source: World Bank (1994, pp. 220 - 221) and own estimates.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 12
What are the implications of the international technological position of Europe? The
first conclusion to be drawn is that there are at least three "old" members of the EU
(notably Germany and the United Kingdom, and possibly France) which match
quite well the overall technological position of Japan and the United States, and that
the northward enlargement of the EU brings in at least one more country, Sweden,
with similar credentials. Moreover, overlapping specialization profiles indicate that
five "old" EU members and two Scandinavian countries dominate the range of
products representing intermediate technology. Finally, the rest of the "old"
members meet Austria and the candidates from Eastern and Central Europe in that
they are all specialized in goods embodying standard technology. Therefore, while
the northward enlargement of the EU is likely to moderately strengthen the EU's
technological position in the high and intermediate ranges, the eastward
enlargement is bound to substantially increase the EU's output capacity for
standard-technology goods.
Another implication Qf Europe's pattern of technological specialization is that there
is scope for technology transfer within the EU, especially from Club 1 to Clubs 2
and 3, and from Club 2 to Club 3. To the extent that technology transfer takes place
through trade, a potential for technology-driven inter-industry trade within the EU
can be observed. In addition, existing technological disparities point towards a
potential for commercial channels of technology transfer, such as licensing and
direct investment, within the EU. With respect to Club 3 members from Eastern and
Central Europe, the countries with the lowest relative level of income per capita,
both commercial and non-commercial channels of technology transfer could have a
role during the transformation process.
2. Specialization Within Product Groups . •
High-Technology Products
Of the four European countries in Club 1, only two, Germany and the United
Kingdom, are specialized in 8 or more SITC product groups representing high
technology, thereby coining quite close to the presence of Japan and the United
States in the high-technology segment of international trade (Table A2). This
notwithstanding, Japan is specialized in three product groups which are not listed in
the Club l's pattern of specialization: computers, semiconductors and optical
equipment. All four Club 1 countries are specialized in pharmaceutical products and
general machinery. Other important product groups are special machinery, medicalBibiiofrhek
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apparatus, and ships. Overlapping of Club l's specialization occurs with Club 2
(pharmaceutical products, aircraft, and ships), Club 3 (electrical machinery and
ships), and Japan and the United States (all kinds of machinery, medical apparatus,
ships, and scientific instruments).
Intermediate-Technology Products
This category of products is the most difficult to define accurately. It is composed
of products as diverse as chemicals, sound recording equipment, manufactures
made out of rubber and leather, and mineral fuels, some of which could be probably
considered to embody high and others low technology. This is the reason why in
some cases the leading suppliers of intermediate technology products are at the
same time leading suppliers of either high- (Germany, United Kingdom) or low-
(Austria, Poland) technology products (Table A3). Nevertheless, it is useful to have
a category in-between in order to accomodate products and countries which would
be certainly misclassified in either of the extreme categories, even if overlappings
(of Club 2 with Clubs 1 and 3 as well as with Japan and the United States) were to
be much more common in the intermediate- than in other technology segments.
Standard-Technology Products
Regarding standard-technology goods, the most important European suppliers (as
measured by the number of product groups with TS > 0) are clearly located in
Central and Eastern Europe, and closely followed by Southern European countries
(Table A4). Overlapping with Club 1 is rare, as also are overlappings with the
profiles of Japan and the United States. The opposite is true with respect to Club 2,
however. Club 3 probably overlaps with the specialization of developing countries
and some OECD countries not included in the sample.
IV. Does Competitiveness Matter?
Though the primary interest in this paper is to derive a cross-country picture of
technological specialization at a certain point in time (1992), it is interesting to note
that 9 countries (out of a total of 22 in the sample) were more or less affected by
shifts in their respective specialization profiles (as measured by the TS index)
occuring between 1989 and 1992 (Table 2). What are the reasons for those shifts?
The detailed discussion of the index of technological specialization in the lastTSE.DOC . 06.03.95 't M
section revealed that TS is sensitive to changes in the ratio of exports to imports of
a good, and in the overall balance of trade. The latter implies, for example, that a
formerly positive TS value for a particular product could become negative as a
consequence of trade balance changes, even if the exports and imports of this
product were unchanged. This means that the factors determining the overall trade
balance and the ratio of exports to imports of individual products have an influence
on the technological specialization profile of countries. According to
macroeconomic theory, in an open economy the balance of trade is determined by
the relative price level (the ratio of domestic to foreign prices) and the nominal
exchange rate between the local and the foreign currency (Dornbush, Fisher 1990,
pp. 750 and 751).
To the extent that certain conditions (elasticities) are met, each time the ratio of
relative prices changes in such a way that domestic goods become cheaper and
foreign goods dearer, theory predicts that exports will expand and imports contract,
assuming the nominal exchange rate remains constant. The same effect can be
achieved if either relative prices stay unchanged and the exchange rate depreciates
or foreign goods become relatively dearer and the exchange rate depreciates.
Increases in exports in response to favourable macroeconomic conditions are
understood by some as an indication that the home country's competitiveness has
improved vis-a-vis its trade partners (Dornbush, Fisher 1990, pp. 185 and 751). By
contrast, Krugman (1994, p. 34) and Porter (1990, p. 6) have pointed out that there
is no such thing as a competitive country, and that the word "competitive" should be
used exclusively as an adjective for firms and/or products. Moreover, if a country
were chosen as a location of economic activity by "competitive" firms successfully
selling "competitive" products abroad, this does not mean that every firm located in
that country or every single product produced in that country must be "competitive".
However, the ability of a firm to increase its sales abroad does not only depend on
the firm itself (and on its products) but also on macroeconomic conditions. For a
firm operating in the field of standard technologies, where prices are generally
given and cost constitutes the only parameter under the firm's command, the ability
of a firm to lower its cost does not extend to the ability to influence a country's
macroeconomic conditions. Under these circumstances, relative prices and the
nominal exchange rate certainly have a role in ultimately co-determining a firm's
international competitiveness and, consequently, a country's specialization.
Similarly, the competitiveness of firms offering intermediate-technology products
for which many suppliers exist in the world and for which the scope for productTSE.DOC . 06.03.95 15
differentiation is limited, is also influenced by macroeconomic conditions. The only
case in which macroeconomic conditions could seem to matter less is when
imperfect competition or monopoly prevails, a market structure often found in the
high-technology field. The justification for imperfect competition in the high-
technology segment stems from the nature of new technology as a nonrival but
(partially) excludable good (Romer 1994, p. 13). Firms owning new technology are
able to exclude competitors from using it for at least some period of time. As long
as monopoly rents can be earned from innovations, the firm is free to adjust both
parameters, price and cost, to market developments and to expand its market share
by maintaining technological leadership, and thus potentially in a position to largely
offset unfavourable macroeconomic conditions by choosing appropriate adjustment
paths at the firm level.
Thus, by bringing in technological specialization, the location of economic activity
seems to become relevant for firms longing to be competitive in standard and
intermediate technologies. What actually matters are economic policies of countries
to the extent that they affect trade (exports and imports), in particular, monetary,
incomes and exchange rate policies; commercial policies are omitted in order to
keep the approach simple. Even if one were to argue that optimal macroeconomic
conditions are not sufficient for a firm to be "competitive", because it is still up to
the individual firm to perform, the indication is that locational characteristics might
constitute a necessary condition for a well-performing firm to keep on doing so,
particularly if the firm supplies standard- and/or intermediate-technology goods. It
is then straightforward to refer to locational characteristics in terms of favourable
macroeconomic conditions as constituting a "policy advantage" of countries or
regions. Figure 1 summarizes the discussion and presents a new framework within
which countries can be positioned with respect to their technological specialization
and policy advantage (Figure la); an optimal specialization path for countries is
shown in Figure lb.
The problem now is to find a suitable indicator for policy advantage. Considering
that the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of domestic to foreign prices
4 have
been identified above as the key variables influencing the quality of a location of
economic activity for firms supplying the world market with standard- and/or
intermediate-technology products, there are good reasons for choosing the real
Reflecting, among others, the impact of incomes policies.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95
1 - Relationship between Technological
Specialization and Policy Advantage
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effective or multilateral exchange rate (REER) as an empirical indicator of policy
advantage. Put in simple terms, the REER is defined as
( 2 ) REERj = ej. p* . trwj
where: ej = nominal exchange rate expressed in US $ per unit of the
country j's currency,
p* = ratio of domestic prices to foreign prices,
trwj = weights representing the share of country j's major trade
partners in its foreign tradeTSE.DOC . 06.03.95 17
Assuming that trwj is constant, the REER is influenced by movements in the
nominal exchange rate and relative prices as can be seen from Table 4. Exports are
normally encouraged whenever the REER depreciates and discouraged whenever it
appreciates; the opposite is true for imports. A constant REER equally benefits
exporters and importers, because it reflects movements in the nominal exchange
rate and relative prices which offset each other. In case both effects do not perfectly
offset each other, the net impact on the REER can not be determined ex ante. Out of
the several definitions of the REER applied in the literature (Durand, Simon, Webb
1992), in this paper use is made of the one found in the International Financial
Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 1985). The details of
the algebraic derivation of the REER are contained in Appendix B.
For the countries in the sample, the values of the REER (Table A5) and the index of
technological specialization in 1989 and 1992 (Table 2) lead to the picture shown in
Figure 2. Compared to 1990, the base year of the IMF's REER index, there were
shifts in the policy advantage enjoyed by some of the Club 1 countries, notably
Germany and Sweden, as well as in the policy advantage of the United States.
While the position of the United States improved, the one of Germany and Sweden
deteriorated. However, this change in the REER did not affect the technological
specialization of these countries, as far as high-technology products are concerned,
possibly because, as was hypothesized above, these products tend to be independent
of policy advantage or disadvantage. Shifts in the specialization profile were
experienced by Club 1 countries only to the extent that they also supplied standard-
and/or intermediate-technology products (for example, the United Kingdom and
France). The most dramatic changes happened in Central and Eastern Europe
(members of Club 3). Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia lost their role as
suppliers of intermediate-technology products, and Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and
Romania lost policy advantage in the wake of the transformation process. Hungary,
in 1989 a leading supplier of standard-technology products, joined the other Eastern
European countries in 1992 to become a high-cost supplier of those products.TSR.DOT. . 06.03.<» 18
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Table 4. Determinants of the Real Effective Exchange Rate
Nominal Exchange
Rate
Fixed
Flexible + A
- A
Relative Prices
Constant
no change
appreciation
depreciation
+ A
appreciation
appreciation
indeterminate
-A
depreciation
indeterminate
depreciation
Source: Own compilation.
V. Summary and Conclusions
It might be too soon to empirically test Lester Thurow's exclamation "Future
historians will record the twenty-first century belonged to the House of Europe!"
(Thurow 1992, p. 258). With respect to the optimism expressed in the survey on the
EU recently published by The Economist (1994), the evidence presented in this
paper with the intention to shed some light on the actual role of Europe in the world
economy in the early 1990s does not go even half the way in the opposite direction,
which implies that there is no ground for unconditionally sharing the rather
pessimistic diagnosis concerning the technological position of Europe put forward
in the European Commission's White Book (1993).
What is the good news? The findings indicate that the EU's international
technological specialization covers goods of different technological sophistication.
The profiles of the leading European countries match quite well the profiles of the
United States and Japan in the high-technology field; any remaining differences
between EU and these countries leave scope for mutually beneficial trade. The EU's
broad technological portfolio reflects substantial differences between the profiles of
the EU member countries, which can be taken as an indication of a vast potential
for technology transfer and trade within the EU. Differences in the specialization
patterns between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe also point at the existence
of important opportunities for the EU member countries in helping to close the
East-West technology gap.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 2Q
The empirical results also identify a certain relationship between technological
specialization and policy advantage, the latter denoting a country's monetary,
inpomes and exchange rate policies with an impact on international trade. This
relationship is very close in the standard- and intermediate- technology segment and
largely unimportant in the high-technology segment. In the former segments,
movements in policy advantage draw the line between specializing in standard
and/or intermediate technologies and between a high-cost location and a leading
location for manufacturing activities. By contrast, high-technology products are
generally supplied under imperfect competition and individual firms have price,
cost and technological parameters under their command and are thus enabled to
adjust to unfavourable local macroeconomic conditions (policy disadvantage of
locations) without necessarily loosing world market shares. The estimates give
support to the hypothesis that policy advantage is largely irrelevant in the high-
technology field and to the hypothesis that policy advantage does matter for
specialization and locational decisions associated with the production of low-
technology goods.
The EU's technological portfolio can be interpreted as constituting a hedge against
the risk of overspecialization in any one segment of the technological spectrum in a
rapidly changing world and thus as offering a solid background for the tasks ahead,
particularly for the northward and eastward enlargements, and for the
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. However, some risks remain. While the
northward enlargement of the EU moderately strengthens the EU's specialization
profile in the intermediate- and high-technology fields, the eastward enlargement is
bound to substantially expand the EU's output capacity for standard-technology
goods. To accommodate the Central and Eastern European countries' profile in the
EU means to accelerate structural change in Southern Europe and in other member
countries with overlapping profiles. This will only be possible to the extent that the
single market is fully implemented in all industries and countries, and to the extent
that highly protected industries (agriculture, steel, textiles) are liberalized. If a
monetary union should come into being in the 1990s, as scheduled in the Maastricht
Treaty, it remains to be seen whether the EU's monetary and exchange rate policy
will benefit the EU as a location of economic activity for firms engaged in the
standard- and intermediate-technology segment. Policies not meeting this
requirement could make initiatives aiming at an eastward enlargement very
difficult to succeed and, at the same time, create incentives for firms based in the
EU member countries to relocate in third countries.TSE.DOC . 06.03.9.1 21
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Appendix A: TablesTSE.DOC . 06.03.95
Table Al. Technology Content of Traded Goods by SITC (Rev. 3) Headings and
Code Numbers
Code Number
I. High Technology
54
72
74
75
764
772
774
776
778
792
793
87
88
2. Intermediate Technology
3
5 0ess 54)
61
62
64
71
73
76 (less 764)
77 (less 772,774,776,778)
78
3. Standard Technology
0
1
2
4
63
65
66
67
68
69
79 (less 792,793)
81
82
83
84
85
89
9
Heading
8
Pharmaceutical products
Machinery specialized for part, industries
General industrial machinery and equipment
Computer and other office machines
Telecommunications equipment
Electronic components (excl. semiconductors)
Medical apparatus
Semiconductors, etc.
Electrical machinery and apparatus
Aircraft and associated equipment, spacecraft, etc.
Ships, boats and floating structures
Professional, scientific and controlling instruments
Photographic and optical apparatus and equipment
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
Chemicals and related products
Leather, leather manufactures
Rubber manufactures
Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp
Power generating machinery and equipment
Metal working machinery
Sound recording equipment
Household appliances, transformers, etc.
Road vehicles
Food and live animals
Beverages and tobacco
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
Cork and wood manufactures
Textile yam, fabrics
Non-metallic mineral manufactures
Iron and steel
Non-ferrous metals
Manufactures of metals
Other transport equipment
Prefabricated buildings etc.
Furniture etc.
Travel goods, handbags etc.
Articles of apparel and clothing etc.
Footwear
Miscellaneous manuf. articles
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere
a Abbreviated; wording occasionally deviates from the official source.
Source: Own grouping; United Nations (1986).TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 26
Table A2. Europe: International Specialization
8 in High-Technology Goods,
1992
Countries
Old EU Member Countries
Belgium/Luxembourg
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
Northward EU Enlargement
Austria
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Eastward EU Enlargement
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Third Countries
Japan
United States
High-Technology Goods'
5
54,764,778,88 "
54,72,74,774,793,87
54,74,764,772,792,793
54,72,74,772,774,778,793,87
54,75,87, 88
72, 74,792,793
774,776,792,793,88
776,793
792,793
54,72,74,764,774,778,792,793, 87
72,74,772,793
72,764,774,793
793
54, 72, 74, 764,774
778,793
793
778
793 '
793
72, 74,75,764,772,774,776, 778,793,87
54, 72,74,774,778,792,793,87
a As measured by the index of technological specialization (TS);
b only the SITC code number of those subgroups is reported here, in which
shows a positive TS index;
c total number of subgroups is 13.
No. of
Subgroups
0
4
6
6
8
0
4
4
5
2
2
9
4
4
1
5
2
1
1
1
1
88 11
8
the corresponding country
Source: Own calculations with OECD trade data.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 27
Table A3. Europe: International Specialization in Intermediate-Technology
Goods, 1992
Countries
Old EU Member Countries
Belgium/Luxembourg
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
Northward EU Enlargement
Austria
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Eastward EU Enlargement
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Third Countries
Japan
United States
Intermediate-Technology Goods"
5,62,76,78
71
5,62, 71,77, 78
5,71,73,77,78
-
5,61,62
61,62,71,73,77
3,5
64,77
61,62,78
3,5,61,62,71,73
61,62,64,71,73,76,77
61,64,76
3
64,71,73,76,78
62,73
3,62,64
3,62,77
3,61,62,71
5
62,64,71,73,76,77,78
5,61,71,73,77
a As measured by the index of technological specialization (TS);
b only the SITC code number of those subgroups is reported here, in which
shows a positive TS index;
c total number of subgroups is 10.
No. of
Subgroups
0
4
1
5
5
0
3
5
2
2
3
6
7
3
1
5
2
3
3
4
1
7
5
the corresponding country
Source: Own calculations with OECD trade data.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 28
Table A4. Europe: International Specialization
a in Standard-Technology Goods,
1992
Countries Standard-Technology Goods
b No. of
Subgroups
0
Old EU Member Countries
Belgium/Luxembourg 0,4,63,65,66,67,68,81 8
Denmark 0,2,63,66, 79, 81,82,9 8
France 0,1,67,79,81,83,9 7
Germany 65,67,69,79,89 5
Greece 0,1,2,4,66,67,68, 84,9 9
Ireland 0,1,2,89,9 5
Italy 65,66,69,79,81,82,83,84,85,89 10
Netherlands 0, 1,2,4,65,68,79,9 8
Portugal 1,2,4,63,65,66,69,79,82,84,85,9 12
Spain 0,1,4,63,65,66,67.68,69,79,82,85,9 13
United Kingdom 1,66,67,79,9 5
Northward EU Enlargement
Austria 1,63,65,66,67,69,81,89,9 9
Finland 2,63,67,68,79,81,9 7
Norway 0,68 2
Sweden 2,63,67,69,82 5
Eastward EU Enlargement
Bulgaria 0,1,2,4,63,66,67,68,81,82,83,84,85 13
Czechoslovakia 0,2,63,65,66,67,68,69,81,82,83,84,85,9 14
Hungary 0,1,2,4,63,66,67,68,69,81,82,83,84,85 14
Poland 0,2,63,66,67,68,69,81,82,83,84,85 12
Romania 63,66,67,68,69,81,82,83,84,85 10
Third Countries
Japan 65,67,69,79,9 5
United States 0,1,2,4,79,9 6
a As measured by the index of technological specialization (TS);
b only the SITC code number of those subgroups is reported here, in which the corresponding country
shows a positive TS index;
c total number of subgroups is 18.
Source: Own calculations with OECD trade data.TSE.DOC . 06.03,95 29
Table A5.
Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Europe: Real Effective Exchange Rates, 1985 -1993 (1990 = 100)
Country
Austria Belgium Denmark France United
Kingdom
REER Index
a
93.5612
97.6285
100.3057
99.7347
98.4206
100.0000
98.5125
100.4697
102.8555
93.2777
97.1989
100.2030
97.5209
96.1628
1O0.O0O0
98.7231
99.5331
99.6365
88.8086
94.4442
98.7503
98.2502
96.3930
100.0000
96.2184
97.5440
98.8917
96.2038
99.6413
100.8755
98.5614
96.5071
100.0000
97.0084
98.8884
99.5632
96.0095
89.3464
89.2438
96.3471
96.7251
100.0000
101.8850
98.5858
88.5353
a Based on consumer price index.
Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Country
Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway
REER Index
3
93.7331
99.2216
102.4915
99.9434
97.5390
100.0000
97.8595
101.4788
105.7597
85.5809
91.6339
94.3602
93.1541
95.3382
100.0000
100.6297
99.5055
83.6386
98.5451
99.2931
99.0187
98.3235
98.0482
100.0000
99.7909
100.3780
100.7954
97.2763
102.8385
104.7065
102.2389
98.1949
100.0000
98.7106
101.2265
102.4248
98.4884
97.0270
99.0287
101.3858
100.7307
100.0000
96.4521
97.1505
93.6734
a Based on consumer price index.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 30
Table A5.
Year
1985
1986,
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
(continued)
Country
Sweden Finland Greece Ireland Portugal
REERlndex
a
92.4660
91.8235
91.6602
94.9444
96.3610
10O.0000
104.6717
105.4219
87.0168
88.7675
88.7518
90.5875
93.0127
97.9918
100.0000
95.1743
82.6607
71.5604
94.8398
88.8367
90.8541
93.2023
94.2021
100.0000
101.1974
104.4428
103.9713
96.6388
103.5445
102.1919
98.6656
96.4796
100.0000
96.8765
99.9178
94.0469
91.3424
90.4617
89.2332
89.7807
93.8077
100.0000
106.7952
116.5241
111.6217
a Based on consumer price index.
Year
1985
1986
1987.
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Country
Spain Japan United States Hungary Poland
REER Index
a
75.8704
80.7912
84.0685
87.4960
92.7940
100.0000
101.2111
101.9936
89.0522
85.5395
109.7175
115.6186
122.0385
111.8902
100.0000
107.4159
111.1245
130.6208
143.6889
120.7765
108.8342
102.3059
105.8577
100.0000
98.2950
95.9348
99.0736
114.8654
103.4251
93.3024
94.8276
96.0398
100.0000
113.3681
122.3072
134.7821
203.15976
159.4158
115.9900
105.0534
US.6428
100.0000
153.9018
152.1922
162.8741
a Based on consumer price index.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Online
Databank.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 H
Appendix B: The Real Effective Exchange RateTSE.DOC . 06.03,95 22
The real effective exchange rate (REER) used in this paper as an indicator of policy
advantage is taken from the IMFs International Financial Statistics. The IMFs
REER is defined as the MERM-weighted nominal effective exchange rate adjusted
for relative prices. MERM-weights are derived from the IMFs multilateral
exchange rate model (MERM) of 17 countries: each weight represents the MERM's
"estimate of the effect on the trade balance of the country in question of a 1 percent
change in the domestic currency price of each of the other currencies, taken one at
the time" (IMF 1985, p. x). The MERM-weighted nominal effective exchange rate
(NEER) obtains from
(Bl) NEERj* = II —£± , y* = 1,2,...,17
M{ NEjt)
where: NEj*t= the US dollar price of one unit of the currency of country j* in
period t relative to its price in the base period (1980)
w;*j = effect of a 1 percent change in the price of currency j* in terms
of currency j on the trade balance of country j*, measured in its
own currency and deflated by the induced change in the aver-
age of its export and import prices in its own currency in 1980.
The weights WJ*J are obtained by simulating the MERM and
observing the impact on the trade balance.
The NEER is then calculated by dividing a country j*'s relative nominal exchange
rate (NEj*t) by the weighted product or geometric average of the other 16 countries'
relative nominal exchange rates. The figure resulting from this computation is then
multiplied by 100 and transformed into an index number with 1990 as its base
period.
The IMFs REER represents the product of the NEER and the index of the ratio of a
price or cost indicator of the country j* in its own currency to a weighted geometric
average of the corresponding price or cost indicator for 16 other countries in their
respective currencies. The IMF publishes REERs on the basis of six different price
or cost indicators (relative unit labour costs, relative normalized unit labour costs,
relative value-added deflators, relative wholesale prices, relative export unit values,
relative consumer prices). Since not all concepts are available for all countries, in
this paper preference was given to relative consumer prices, which are generally
available, although they can be criticized for giving too much weight to indirect
taxes.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 33
More generally, the REER can be derived following Durand, Simon and Webb
(1992), and Turner and Van't dack (1993) as a measure of overall policy advantage
composed of two partial measures, a measure of import policy advantage and one of
export policy advantage. Overall policy advantage is then calculated as a weighted
average of import and export policy advantage.
Omitting time indices, import policy advantage (IPA) is based on the following
price differential:
(B2) PJ*-PJ*=PJ*- lpjj*mr
which represents the difference between the country j*'s domestic price (pj*) and
the import price in country j* (p/»), both expressed in US$. The import price
measure can be also written as the export prices of country j*'s trading partners
\Pjj*) weighted by the share of imports of country j* originating in country j (mjj*).
Taking natural logarithmus and converting the dollar prices in (B2) to national
currencies using a simple nominal exchange rate (Nj) (US$ per unit of national
currency) yields
(B3) IPAj* = In
Pj*
n
j
= ln n
Pi*
.i.\
pii* n
due to Y.fijj* = 1. Making use of the bilateral exchange rate Njj* = Nj*/Nj we get
a single-weighted measure
(B4) IPAj* = In n -^ n
= ln
nTSE.DOC . 06.03.95
While the IPA focusses on the country j*'s home market, the measure of export
policy advantage focusses on country j*'s export markets. Accordingly, EPA is
based on the following price differential:
(B5)
}*}*
representing the difference between the country j*'s export price (/>,„) and the
export prices of country j*'s competitors i in the foreign market j (/>,-), weighted by
the share of the exports of country j* to country j in country j*'s total exports (x^,)
and the share of imports of country j originating in country i in total supply in
country j (excluding imports from country j*) (sy / (1 - sjj*)).
5 Taking logarithmus
and substituting the term SJJ / (1 - SJJ*) for the simpler ayj*, we obtain
(B6) EPAj* = In pj*-]n n
and using national currency prices instead of US$ prices and introducing exchange
rates as in (B3) above, (B6) develops into
(B7) J
Taking
SPAj* = In
advantage
h
of lx
i n
-•'••
a*
=
 ]
i
and
Pi Hi
la
i*j*
)
Xjj*'
ijj* = 1 as = 1 as well as of bilateral exchange
rates as in (B4) above, we get
It should be noted that "total supply" includes import-competing domestic production in
country j and imports from all other countries.TSE.DOC . 06.03.95 35
(B8)
EPA;, = In n n
j [i*J*\.Pi
n
j
i*j*
i
WJ* J
xjj,-
-
= ln
j i
n n
i*i*i*j*
It is easy to see that - in contrast to (B4) - (B8) represents a double-weighted
measure of export policy advantage, which combines the export shares of the
country under study (j*) with the market shares of j*'s competitors (i) in country j.
Now the derivation of the real effective exchange rate (REEK) as a measure of
overall policy advantage simply consists in calculating the trade-weighted average
of the import and export policy advantage measures in the following way:
(B9)
where:
J-
Mr+Xj*
EPAj*
Mj* = country j*'s total imports, and
Xj* = country j*'s total exports.